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Abstract
Associations between markers of ostensible psychological characteristics and social and health inequalities are pervasive but
difficult to explain. In some cases, there may be causal influence flowing from social and health inequalities to psychological
differences, whereas sometimes it may be the other way around. Here, we focus on the possibility that some markers that we
often consider as indexing different domains of individual differences may in fact reflect at least partially overlapping genetic
and/or phenotypic bases. For example, individual differences in cognitive abilities and educational attainment appear to reflect
largely overlapping genetic influences, whereas cognitive abilities and health literacy may be almost identical phenomena at the
phenotypic, never mind genetic, level. We make the case for employing molecular genetic data and quantitative genetic
techniques to better understand the associations of psychological individual differences with social and health inequalities. We
illustrate these arguments by using published findings from the Lothian Birth Cohort and the Generation Scotland studies. We
also present novel findings pertaining to longitudinal stability and change in older age personality traits and some correlates of
the change, molecular genetic data-based heritability estimates of Neuroticism and Extraversion, and the genetic correlations
of these personality traits with markers of social and health inequalities.
As people navigate through their lives, they differ from each other
in a great variety of more or less interconnected ways. In order to
map this complexity, we often create different kinds of quantitative
markers and refer to the classes of markers that correlate or appear
similar in etiology or function as some unitary domains or traits. For
example, we rank people in terms of their educational attainment,
occupational prestige, income, and quality of neighborhood and
refer to these markers as socioeconomic status (Hagger-Johnson,
M~ottus, Craig, Starr, & Deary, 2012). Additionally, we may
rank people in various aspects of health, health-related behavior,
and knowledge and jointly refer to these markers as social and
health inequalities. On a more psychological side, individuals
can be ranked on constructs such as intelligence, personality
traits of different breadth and ﬂavor, well-being, motivation, atti-
tudes, and the like. Each of these markers is supposed to denote
a domain of people’s lives, whereas the borders and interfaces
between these domains are often unknown and may sometimes
be arbitrary.
What we are then interested in is whether and how these dif-
ferent domains relate to each other and (co)develop over time.
For example, social and health inequalities, which are ubiqui-
tously interconnected (Mackenbach et al., 2008), may inﬂuence
psychological differences, or the other way around. Moreover,
the inﬂuence may ﬂow in both directions at the same time
(Deary & Johnson, 2010). What is more, the markers that we
think of as reﬂecting distinct domains of individual differences
may in fact have been stuck to more or less the same territory.
In particular, they may reﬂect the effects of at least partially
overlapping samples of behaviors, skills, or life circumstances
(i.e., phenotypic overlap) or, more distally, shared genetic
underpinnings (i.e., genotypic overlap). For example, the rank-
ings of people on intelligence scores and educational attainment
may reﬂect a largely overlapping basis, of which shared genetic
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inﬂuences may be an important part (Marioni, Davies, et al.,
2014). Highlighting the possibility that even apparently different
types of markers of individual differences may reﬂect shared eti-
ology, or tap the same phenomena at the phenotypic level, is an
important aim of this article.
Centering mostly around the Lothian Birth Cohorts (LBC) and
Generation Scotland (GS) general population cohort studies, the
present article will present examples in favor of all of the above-
described possibilities. We hope that this will highlight the need to
consider very different interpretations of observed associations
between markers of psychological differences and those of social
and health inequalities. This may seem like a trivial suggestion,
but it really is not. For example, as it is so tempting to interpret cor-
relations as reﬂecting causal associations in one or another direc-
tion, we do have to remind ourselves that some correlations may
not really refer to causal associations at all—the constructs that we
are observing as being correlating may at some level and at least
partly reﬂect the same variance. This is exactly why we are reluc-
tant to draw clear-cut boundaries between constructs and only
refer to them as markers of psychological differences or social
inequalities, admitting that even this distinction may be arbitrary.
From among markers of psychological differences, we will
mostly address what are typically referred to as cognitive traits, as
these are the main focus of current LBC- and GS-based research.
However, several examples will pertain to other markers, such as
those typically referred to as personality traits. Social and health
inequalities will be exempliﬁed mostly by educational attainment
and socioeconomic position and markers of physical and mental
health, as well as health-related behaviors and knowledge. Impor-
tantly, a case will be made for genetically informed analyses, and
relevant examples, based on molecular genetic data and quantita-
tive genetic techniques, will be presented.
First, we will review the temporal stability of themarkers of psy-
chological differences and discuss the profound implications of
such stability. Second, we will address the idea that social and
health inequalities may contribute to psychological differences and
review some apparent evidence in favor of it. Third, we will
describe evidence apparently suggesting that the inﬂuence is more
likely to ﬂow the other way around—from psychological character-
istics to social and health inequalities. Fourth, we offer an alternative
explanation by suggesting that markers of psychological differences
and social or health inequalities may often go hand in hand simply
because of reﬂecting the same underlying “something.” We will
then argue that using molecular genetic data coupled with quantita-
tive genetic techniques can be one of the ways to address this possi-
bility. We will provide relevant examples, both already published
as well as new, to demonstrate where this approach is more likely
and less likely to work. Finally, we will argue that in some cases,
the overlap in different markers may be phenotypic.
SUBSTANTIAL PHENOTYPIC STABILITY
At least some markers of psychological differences demonstrate
high stability over several decades of life. This is an important
ﬁnding, as it informs us regarding the degree to which we can
expect other variables to inﬂuence the characteristics that the
markers ostensibly denote (Deary, 2014). The life-course stabil-
ity of a characteristic nearing unity, for example, would limit the
value of any attempts to ﬁnd speciﬁc factors that cause people to
deviate from normative developmental trajectories in this char-
acteristic (even though these trajectories may be inﬂuenced by
both genetic factors and environmental factors the people them-
selves expose them to).
Phenotypic Stability of Cognitive Abilities
The unique feature of the Lothian Birth Cohorts studies (and
Aberdeen Birth Cohorts studies, which we will occasionally
refer to) is the possibility to study participants’ cognitive abilities
over up to eight decades (Deary, 2014; Deary, Whalley, & Starr,
2009). Just to give some details on the background of these stud-
ies, in 1932 and 1947, Scottish educators decided to measure the
cognitive ability of all 11-year-olds going to school on a chosen
day in June; these large-scale tests are known as the Scottish
Mental Surveys. The resulting cognitive ability test scores were
available for 87,498 and 70,805 children, respectively, in 1932
and 1947. These data were preserved, and samples of people
have been followed up in their eighth and ninth decades of life
from both cohorts (in fact, the surviving members of the older
cohort are well over 90 now, and some are still being followed).
Participants have also been retested using the same cognitive
ability test that they took at age 11 (the Moray House Test
No. 12; MHT).
Apparently, individual differences in cognitive ability are
quite highly stable. For example, the correlations of MHT scores
obtained at age 11 with various cognitive ability test scores in the
eighth decade of life range in the .60s and are even higher (.701)
when corrected for restricted variance (Deary, 2014; Deary,
Whalley, Lemmon, Crawford, & Starr, 2000; Deary, Whiteman,
Starr, Whalley, & Fox, 2004; Gow et al., 2011). Correlations
with MHT scores at age 90 were somewhat lower but still well
over .50 (Deary, Pattie, & Starr, 2013). Moreover, these correla-
tions may underestimate the actual stability in cognitive ability
rankings because of less than perfect reliability of the tests.
Phenotypic Stability of Other Psychological
Characteristics
The Scottish Mental Surveys did not include measurements of
other markers of psychological differences, such as personality
traits or well-being, and therefore the data do not allow us to
investigate the lifelong stability of these. However, multiple
measurements in later life have enabled us to investigate the sta-
bility of individuals’ rankings in several personality traits in
older age. Again, the evidence suggests substantial stability.
M~ottus, Johnson, and Deary (2012) created ﬁve latent Big Five
personality trait scores for 209 LBC1921 (follow-up of the 1932
survey) members for ages about 81 and 87 years. The rankings
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of scores correlated from .78 to .89, suggesting that whatever
unique changes in health or environment had happened to the
people, these did not knock them far away from the typical late-
life developmental trajectories of personality traits evidenced in
mean-level trends (M~ottus, Johnson, & Deary, 2012).
The third wave of data collection was recently ﬁnished in
LBC1936 (follow-up of the 1947 survey), allowing us to report
here for the ﬁrst time the rank-order stability estimates of the Big
Five traits between ages 70, 73, and 76.1 The correlations
between latent factor scores from the three testing occasions are
reported in Table 1 (the scales for each factor met the criterion
for full [strict] measurement invariance across the three testing
occasions). The correlations were all above .80 and occasionally
even above .90, exceeding the typical estimates reported by
Roberts and DelVecchio (2000) for similar testing intervals.
Thus, these Scottish data suggest that rankings in both types of
markers of psychological differences—cognitive abilities and
Big Five personality traits—are highly stable over time.
Of course, the time scale to which these personality trait sta-
bility estimates pertain is only a fraction of that spanned by our
studies on the stability of cognitive abilities. Had personality
traits also been measured in childhood, which rank-order stabil-
ities could we observe? They would possibly be lower than those
for cognitive abilities. For example, in a sample of more than
8,000 Britons, the stability of Conscientiousness between ages
16 and 50 was around .15 (Pluess & Bartley, 2015). Similarly,
the rank-order stability estimates for the Big Five traits across
about 40 years (from school age to later adulthood) have been
found to range from around 0 to mostly under .30, across meas-
ures and rater perspectives (Edmonds, Goldberg, Hampson, &
Barckley, 2013). In a meta-analysis, Big Five stability estimates
between .31 and .47 were reported for retest intervals spanning
about 25–35 years (Bazana & Stelmack, 2004). Shorter intervals
yield higher stability estimates (Roberts & DelVecchio, 2000).
Mechanisms of Phenotypic Stability
Individuals’ rankings in the markers of psychological differen-
ces can be stable over time because of stable genetic inﬂuences
on them or because of stable environments, either self-selected,
self-created, or passively exposed to in a consistent manner. For
cognitive ability, follow-up samples of the Scottish Mental Sur-
veys have provided a unique opportunity to test for the degree to
which the remarkable phenotypic stability can be ascribed to
genetic factors.
In particular, this has been made possible by the availability
of genome-wide single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) data
and statistical methods that allow using these data to estimate
genetic correlations on unrelated individuals (genome-wide
complex trait analysis [GCTA]; Yang, Lee, Goddard, &
Visscher, 2011; for deﬁnitions of GCTA, genetic correlation,
and other genetics-related terms, see Table 2). In a combined
sample of 1,940 individuals from the Lothian and Aberdeen
Birth Cohorts studies, Deary and colleagues (2012) showed that
the genetic correlation between MHT scores at age 11 and gen-
eral cognitive ability derived from the Wechsler Adult Intelli-
gence Scale-III (WAIS-III; Wechsler, 1997) in the seventh/
eighth life decade was .62, whereas the environmental correla-
tion was .65. The phenotypic correlation was .63 in these data.
This suggests that both genetic and environmental inﬂuences
contribute to the high life-course stability of cognitive ability.
Although such analyses have not been done for other markers
of psychological differences using LBC or GS data, a similar
argument could be made for them. For example, twin studies
have made it clear that both environmental and genetic inﬂuen-
ces contribute to the rank-order stability of personality traits,
although it appears to be the relative contribution of environ-
ment that becomes increasingly important over time (Briley &
Tucker-Drob, 2014).
Implications of High Phenotypic Stability
Although a non-negligible proportion of the phenotypic stability
of psychological characteristics appears attributable to environ-
mental factors, the very fact that phenotypic stability is high, at
least for cognitive abilities, indicates that ﬁnding the environ-
mental markers that matter for the stability or change in these
characteristics will be difﬁcult. This is simply because limited
variance in change means that there is little to relate to other var-
iables. Furthermore, and leaving change aside, high phenotypic
stability can guide our interpretation of the correlates of individ-
ual differences in psychological characteristics at any single
point in time. Even if we ﬁnd substantial correlations between
some markers of people’s environments and phenotypically sta-
ble psychological differences, the environmental markers are
unlikely to be interpretable as reﬂecting causes of individual
differences of the psychological characteristics—unless they
reﬂect aspects of environments that are stable across decades
too. The environmental experiences that matter for the psycho-
logical characteristics typically contribute to the stability of these
characteristics (Briley & Tucker-Drob, 2014; Caspi, Roberts, &
Shiner, 2005). It is then more plausible that these markers of
environment are either effects of variability in the phenotypi-
cally stable psychological characteristics (and whatever under-
lies their stability), or the different kinds of markers simply
covary because they reﬂect some common inﬂuences. Either
way, high phenotypic stability has profound implications for
Table 1 Correlations of FFM Scores Across Three Waves of Testing
in LBC1936
Age 70–Age 73 Age 73–Age 76 Age 70–Age 76
Emotional Stability .84 .82 .81
Extraversion .92 .89 .87
Intellect .90 .88 .95
Agreeableness .83 .84 .82
Conscientiousness .91 .91 .85
Note. These are average ages. N5 1,091, 866, and 697 (respectively, for ages
70, 73, and 76). FFM5 Five-Factor Model.
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attempts to link the stable psychological characteristics to other
markers.
PSYCHOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS
IN RELATION TOMARKERS OF SOCIAL
AND HEALTH INEQUALITIES
Social and Health Inequalities as Contributors
to Psychological Differences and Changes
in These
To the extent that the stability of the rankings of phenotypic
characteristics is lower than unity, however, it may make sense
to (cautiously) look for potential environmental causes of the
variability in them. Besides purely scientiﬁc interest, these
attempts may be fueled by hopes to be able to intervene on unde-
sirable characteristics such as low or declining cognitive ability
or poor mental health. For example, many studies have linked
modiﬁable medical conditions such as diabetes, obesity or cardi-
ovascular disease to cognitive abilities (Nash & Fillit, 2006;
Strachan, Deary, Ewing, & Frier, 1997). Especially if such stud-
ies are prospective, whereby disease onset has been measured
some time before cognitive ability (e.g., Haring et al., 2013), it
is hoped that a possible cause of cognitive decline has been
identiﬁed. For other examples of how social inequalities may be
consequential, research has linked exposure to education
and multiple languages to higher cognitive ability (Falch &
SandgrenMassih, 2011; Kave, Eyal, Shorek, & Cohen-Mansﬁeld,
2008).
Such ﬁndings are notoriously difﬁcult to interpret, however.
A contemporaneous correlation between a marker that purport-
edly indexes something about environment (or something non-
psychological, anyway) and a marker that purportedly indexes
psychological differences could imply that either has the causal
role—to the extent that there is any causality at all between the
Table 2 Explanations of Genetics-Related Terms
Term Explanation
Genetic correlation A genetic correlation examines the association between the genetic influences on one trait with the genetic
influences on another trait. Two traits having a high genetic correlation means that, largely, the same genetic
variants account for individual differences in both of them. The magnitude of genetic correlation is
independent from that of phenotypic correlation. For example, even in the event of a small phenotypic
correlation, the genetic correlation could be close to unity. Similarly to a genetic correlation, one may
calculate an environmental correlation between two variables. This reflects the degree to which environmental
influences on the two variables overlap. Its magnitude is also independent of the magnitude of phenotypic
correlation.
Genome-wide complex
trait analysis (GCTA)
Even in a group of unrelated people, there are common genetic variants that are shared between individuals.
Conceptually, GCTA can explore whether unrelated individuals who share more common genetic variants also
tend to be more similar in terms of their phenotypic traits or outcomes. The method therefore estimates the
proportion of phenotypic variance explained by common genetic variants. As a result, GCTA is
complementary to other methods of estimating heritability, such as twin- or adoption-based designs. The
method can also be used to estimate genetic correlations. The downside of GCTA is that it requires very
large samples.
Additive genetic effects In order to determine how much influence a number of genes have on a trait, one can sum their individual
contributions (additive genetic model). This model assumes that genes influence the trait independently of
other genes or the environment. So, additive genetic effects do not include, for example, genetic dominance
and epistasis, which are referred to as nonadditive genetic influences. The GCTA-based estimates of heritabil-
ity and genetic correlations reflect additive effects, as do heritability estimates based on adoption studies, for
example. Twin designs, in contrast, allow for estimating both additive and nonadditive genetic effects.
Polygenic risk score Such scores summarize the genetic “risk” for a particular trait or outcome based on the contributions from
many single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs). The scores are calculated based on the summary output from
genome-wide association studies (GWAS), which contains information on the SNPs, the “effect allele” for
each SNP, the regression weight per effect allele in the prediction of the trait, and the p-value for the regres-
sion statistic. This information can then be used in independent samples to create a risk score for each indi-
vidual. For each SNP, the number of copies of the risk allele carried by an individual will be multiplied by the
regression weight from the initial GWAS. These products are summed across SNPs for each individual to give
his or her total risk score. In some circumstances, the best risk score for a trait will use information from
only a subset of SNPs. This can be examined by using different thresholds for the inclusion of SNPs, based on
p-values from the initial GWAS. The threshold that produces the risk scores that most strongly predict the
trait is selected.
Linkage disequilibrium This describes nonrandom associations of alleles: Certain alleles are inherited together more frequently than
expected under independence/chance. When genetic information gets passed down across generations,
chunks of genetic information tend to be inherited together. Typically, SNPs that are closer together are more
likely to be inherited in a single chunk than those farther apart.
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two, of course. Moreover, given the high phenotypic stability of
some psychological differences markers, considering individual
differences in them as effects of environment may be unjustiﬁed,
as was discussed above: The differences are often there before
the environmental exposures of interest. Even if the marker of
environment has been measured a fair number of years before
the psychological marker, it may have been the stable level of
the latter that contributed to people being exposed to the former
in the ﬁrst place. It is therefore preferable to have information on
and control for the lifelong (“premorbid”) level of the psycho-
logical marker. Put differently, this amounts to looking for the
determinants of change in individuals’ rankings in psychologi-
cal characteristics—something that may be limited in magni-
tude, as we have argued above.
Participants of the Lothian Birth Cohorts studies sat an intel-
ligence test at age 11. Although it is likely that many aspects of
social inequalities, such as parental education or material resour-
ces, would already have inﬂuenced children by this time, they
had not yet experienced at least some of the social and health
inequalities that might be considered relevant for later cognitive
differences, such as full educational attainment, job characteris-
tics, or speciﬁc diseases (e.g., type 2 diabetes). This has provided
a good opportunity to study the extent to which a variety of
markers of social or health inequalities may contribute to the—
admittedly limited—variance in cognitive ability over and above
the variance in its stable baseline levels. Indeed, a number of
such factors have been identiﬁed.
For example, using the data of LBC1921 and LBC1936,
Ritchie, Bates, Der, Starr, and Deary (2013) were interested in
the effect of educational attainment on later-life cognitive abil-
ity, controlling for age 11 ability. Indeed, it appeared that the
length of educational exposure had a signiﬁcant effect on later-
life cognitive ability, with each additional year conferring an
additional 1.42 IQ points on top of participants’ childhood cog-
nitive ability. However, the study also asked whether the associ-
ation pertained to cognitive ability as an index of some
presumably fundamental aspect of information-processing abil-
ity as opposed to the more speciﬁc set of skills tapped by the
MHT. To this end, educational attainment was also correlated to
measures of reaction and inspection time, which were assumed
to tap basic information-processing speed and quality. Although
more years of schooling predicted shorter reaction times and
more correct recognition of stimuli at short exposure times in
older age, the associations decreased substantially when age 11
ability was taken into account. It was therefore concluded that
education may have a beneﬁcial effect on complex cognitive
abilities in a broad sense but not because it improves basic
information-processing ability. Ritchie, Bates, and Deary (2015)
also showed that the beneﬁcial effect of education on cognitive
ability does not pertain to the shared variance of different cogni-
tive skills (g) but the domain-speciﬁc variance in them.
As another example, LBC1936 data were used to show that
speaking one or more non-native languages correlated with sev-
eral markers of later-life cognitive ability (Bak, Nissan, Aller-
hand, & Deary, 2014); some of these associations remained
signiﬁcant even when age 11 ability was controlled for. Like-
wise, M~ottus, Gale, Starr, and Deary (2012) found that age 70
cognitive ability correlated with self-reported quality of life in
psychological, environmental, and physical domains even when
age 11 cognitive ability was taken into account, suggesting that
the correlations pertained to lifelong change in cognitive ability
rather than its stable levels. Similarly, characteristics of work
experiences, such as occupational complexity (Smart, Gow, &
Deary, 2014), have been linked with cognitive abilities of
LBC1936 members, as have social support, lack of loneliness
(Gow, Corley, Starr, & Deary, 2013), and physical activity
(Gow, Corley, Starr, & Deary, 2012).
In a similar vein, a small detrimental effect of smoking on later-
life cognitive abilities of LBC1936 members—net of lower child-
hood cognitive ability, which predisposes people to pick up smok-
ing—has been reported (Corley, Gow, Starr, & Deary, 2012).
Reverse Causation
Although there apparently are examples of how environmental
factors may inﬂuence cognitive abilities, numerous attempts to
identify them have also “failed,” as we will discuss below.
Given the implications of high phenotypic stability of cognitive
abilities, this is, of course, not surprising. Even though a particu-
lar marker of environment or health often appears correlated
with cognitive abilities in older age, the association might be
substantially reduced or vanish completely once the
“premorbid” cognitive ability is controlled for.
For example, numerous studies have shown that people with
diabetes have lower cognitive abilities than those without the
condition, and this is commonly believed to reﬂect the
cognition-impairing effects of diabetes (Strachan, Reynolds,
Marioni, & Price, 2011). M~ottus, Luciano, Starr, and Deary
(2013) compared the age 70 cognitive ability of LBC1936mem-
bers with and without diabetes and found the expected differ-
ence: Those with the condition scored about a third of a standard
deviation lower than those without it. However, nearly identical
association was observed between diabetes status at age 70 and
cognitive ability scores at age 11—the latter being far earlier
than most people with diabetes would have developed the condi-
tion. This suggests that the cognitive ability difference between
those with and without diabetes had existed long before diabetes
emerged in those with the condition. To the extent that this ﬁnd-
ing is generalizable, it turns the diabetes–cognitive ability asso-
ciation on its head: It must be either low cognitive ability (and
perhaps its associated lifestyle and health choices) that contrib-
utes to diabetes or they both have to reﬂect some common
underlying inﬂuences.
As another example, M~ottus, Gale, Starr, and Deary (2012)
observed an association between LBC1936 members’ cognitive
abilities at age 70 and the level of deprivation of their neighbor-
hood as measured by the Scottish Index of Multiple Deprivation
(SIMD; Scottish Executive, 2006). Those in more deprived
neighborhoods had lower cognitive abilities. However, the
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association was no longer detected once age 11 cognitive ability
had been controlled for, suggesting that it was not living in a
poor neighborhood—and whatever else this typically is accom-
panied by—that lowered cognitive abilities, but the other way
around; those who had had lower long-standing cognitive abil-
ities were more likely to be found in more deprived conditions.
Likewise, it is often believed that intellectual engagement is ben-
eﬁcial for cognitive aging. Gow and colleagues (2012) set out to
test this and observed positive correlations between a measure
of social-intellectual engagement and various markers of cogni-
tive ability at age 70. However, most of the associations were
substantially attenuated and ceased to be statistically signiﬁcant
when age 11 cognitive ability was controlled for.
Correlates of Changes in the Big Five Traits
Finding predictors of personality change has also proven rela-
tively difﬁcult. This conclusion is concordant with previous sug-
gestions that attempts to identify speciﬁc markers of environment
that substantially and reliably matter for personality have yielded
only modest results (Turkheimer & Waldron, 2000), although
other authors may have different views (e.g., Specht et al., 2014;
Specht, Egloff, & Schmukle, 2011). We present an example
based on published LBC1921 data and a novel example based on
LBC1936 data (reported here for the ﬁrst time).
M~ottus, Johnson, Starr, and Deary (2012) used the data from
209 LBC1921 members who had completed a 50-item Big Five
questionnaire twice over a period of about 6 years in their ninth
decade of life to construct a latent growth curve model for each
Big Five trait. Such models result in two latent traits, with one
(intercept) representing the baseline trait level and the other
(slope) representing change. We were interested in two questions.
Was there reliable variability in the rates of change in the person-
ality traits as would have been indicated by signiﬁcant variances
in the slope scores? Could this variance be predicted from what
were considered markers of the most important domains of life at
this age: physical ﬁtness, cognitive ability, and level of independ-
ent functioning? Slopes of all Big Five domains showed signiﬁ-
cant variance, but we found only one signiﬁcant effect on them:
Higher cognitive functioning at age 79 predicted less decline in
Conscientiousness in the ninth decade of life. We also found that
decline in Conscientiousness was associated with decline in phys-
ical ﬁtness, potentially reﬂecting either causal effects in either
direction or some common inﬂuences acting on these two
markers of individual differences. Given the number of associa-
tions tested for, however, these could have easily been chance
ﬁndings (M~ottus, Johnson, Starr, & Deary, 2012).
Taking advantage of the fact that LBC1936 members have
now provided three assessments of their Big Five traits, we also
present some novel analyses. We created latent growth models
for each of the traits such that both intercepts and slopes were
deﬁned by the sum scores of the appropriate traits at about ages
70, 73, and 76 years (the use of sum scores as indicators of the
intercept and slope traits was justiﬁed by full [strict]
measurement invariance across the three testing occasions).
Although the slopes of only three of the ﬁve traits (Emotional
Stability, Extraversion, and Conscientiousness) displayed signif-
icant variance, we decided to predict the slopes of all Big Five
traits from the markers of the three arguably most important life
domains considered in M~ottus and colleagues (2012): cognitive
ability, physical ﬁtness, and independent functioning. For each
measurement occasion, cognitive ability was indexed as a prin-
cipal component score of six WAIS-III subtests;2 physical ﬁt-
ness was a principal component score of 6 meter walk time, grip
strength, and forced expiratory volume in one second; and inde-
pendent function was the score of Townsend Disability Scale
(Townsend, 1962). For each Big Five trait, three bifactor latent
growth models were constructed, where personality intercepts
and slopes were deﬁned as above, but additionally, a slope and
an intercept for a covariate (either cognitive ability, physical ﬁt-
ness, or independent functioning) were deﬁned by its scores
from the three testing occasions (Figure 1). The number of
observations varied slightly across models, being generally
around 600 (for each analysis, data from participants with com-
plete observations were used; see Table 3 for details). Models ﬁt
the data well, such that all comparative ﬁt index values exceeded
.95 and all root mean square error of approximation values were
below 0.05.
The slope of each trait was predicted from the baseline levels
of the three covariates. However, from among the 15 predictions
(ﬁve traits and three covariates), only one was signiﬁcant: The
slope of Agreeableness was predicted by baseline physical ﬁt-
ness (r5 .25, p5 .02). Besides, we observed several correla-
tions between personality and covariate slopes. Declining
cognitive ability was tracked with declining Conscientiousness
(r5 .33, p5 .009) and Agreeableness (r5 .42, p5 .02).
Declining independent functioning was linked to declining
Extraversion (r5 .18, p5 .04). Again, however, given the num-
ber of associations, it is possible that some or even all of the
associations reﬂect chance ﬁndings.
Based on these data, there is limited evidence for changes in
personality traits in older age being predictable from markers of
individual differences in other arguably important domains of
life. There may be somewhat stronger evidence, however, for
personality change being in lockstep with changes in these other
life domains. For example, declines in cognitive ability may
contribute to declines in Conscientiousness-type behaviors
because these require a certain level of cognitive functioning, or
the other way around. Or, again, declines in Conscientiousness
and cognitive ability may travel together because they both
reﬂect a more general decline process.
GENES STEP IN
System Integrity as an Alternative Explanation
There is another explanation for the association between cogni-
tive abilities and markers of health and social inequalities: They
all may reﬂect some more general property of the organism.
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Such a general property reﬂecting individual differences in over-
all build quality has been called “system integrity” (Deary,
2012). There is, as yet, no direct measure of or evidence for such
a phenomenon. Instead, its plausibility has been inferred
indirectly from observations that lifelong cognitive ability
(measured in childhood) predicts mortality and various health
conditions, controlling for possible environmental mediators or
confounders such as education, occupational social class, or a
wide range of health-related behaviors (Calvin et al., 2011). The
childhood cognitive ability–mortality association, however,
appears to be notably reduced when other and possibly closer
markers of system integrity, such as basic information-
processing speed, are controlled for (Deary & Der, 2005). Other
evidence potentially in favor of a system integrity–type con-
struct includes ﬁndings that psychomotor coordination in child-
hood correlates with seemingly very different health outcomes
in later life, such as psychological distress or obesity (Gale,
Batty, Cooper, & Deary, 2009), or that cognitive ability—a gen-
eral marker of cognitive development—correlates with the (ﬂuc-
tuating) symmetry of body, which is an ostensible marker of the
stability of bodily development (Banks, Batchelor, & McDaniel,
2010). Interestingly, bodily symmetry also correlates with basic
information-processing speed and robustness (Hope, Bates,
Dykiert, Der, & Deary, 2015), and it increases over childhood
(Hope, Bates, Dykiert, Der, & Deary, 2013), as does cognitive
performance. Higher cognitive abilities have also been associ-
ated with the ability of the brain to cope with systematic insults
(Santarnecchi, Rossi, & Rossi, 2015).
To the extent that system integrity is a viable construct, its
effects may be reﬂected not only in cognitive traits and markers
of physical health but, perhaps eventually, also in other markers
of psychological or social inequalities. For example, we might
expect educational and occupational performance and their eco-
nomic and social correlates, such as income or neighborhood
quality, to partly reﬂect this general property. Even if a well-
built organism provides one with only a little advantage for any
given speciﬁc outcome—a skill or an aspect of health, for exam-
ple—the small advantages may cumulate into a much bigger
advantage over time and across its multiple manifestations.
Genes as a Tool for Testing the Effect of
System Integrity
Since the biological underpinnings of system integrity are not
known, it cannot be measured and thereby controlled for when
markers of psychological differences are linked to each other or
those of social and health inequalities. It seems plausible to
assume, however, that it might, at least in part, reﬂect some sort
of genetic variance. If so, the genetic variance should be
reﬂected in the numerous possible manifestations of system
integrity. Given this, a plausible way to study the possibility that
a particular association is confounded by system integrity is to
use genetic data and expect to see a genetic correlation between
the phenotypically related characteristics. For example, it has
been found elsewhere that having a college education has
Figure 1 Bivariate latent growth model. Trait5 personality trait; Covaria-
te5 either cognitive ability, physical fitness, or independent functioning;
T15 age about 70; T25 age about 73; T35 age about 76. Paths of interest
are indicated in boldface.
Table 3 Correlations of Personality Slopes From Age 70 to 76 With the Baseline and Change in Cognitive Ability, Physical Fitness, and
Independent Functioning (LBC1936)
Cognitive Ability
N5 593–596
Physical Fitness
N5 597–600
Independent Functioning
N5 618–621
Intercept Slope Intercept Slope Intercept Slope
Emotional Stability –.07 .08 –.05 .11 –.04 –.08
Extraversion .10 .07 .08 .17 –.05 .18*
Intellect .15 .21 .12 –.19 –.01 –.06
Agreeableness .05 .42* .25* –.05 –.13 –.19
Conscientiousness .05 .33** .10 .11 –.02 –.11
Note. N5 number of observations used. The estimates are standardized path coefficients.
*p< .05. **p< .01.
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genetic correlations with various markers of physical and mental
health (Bulik-Sullivan et al., 2015); it is possible that markers of
(normal) psychological variation do as well. Of course, system
integrity may not reﬂect only genetic inﬂuences. For example,
facial symmetry was reported to be associated with parental
socioeconomic status, although bodily symmetry was not
(Hope, Bates, Penke, et al., 2013). Facial symmetry being a
potential marker of the stability of bodily development and
thereby system integrity, this ﬁnding suggests that nongenetic
factors may also contribute to variance in the construct—to the
extent that parental socioeconomic status is independent of
children’s genes, of course.
Can Other Markers of Psychological
Differences Reflect System Integrity?
The concept of system integrity originates from research into
cognitive abilities and was devised as one possible explanation
for their associations with mortality (Deary, 2012). Its relevance
for other markers of individual differences is not clear yet. It
must also be borne in mind that cognitive abilities are relatively
(though not completely) phenotypically uncorrelated with at
least some other markers of psychological differences such as
occupational interests or personality traits (Ackerman & Heg-
gestad, 1997), which themselves tend to form a positive mani-
fold (Van der Linden, te Nijenhuis, & Bakker, 2010).
However, a somewhat similar logic might be and has been
applied to other markers of psychological differences such as
personality traits. Their associations with markers of health and
social inequalities might to some, or perhaps even a large,
degree reﬂect some sort of shared genetic variance (a general
genetic “pull”; Turkheimer, Pettersson, & Horn, 2014). Our
above-reported ﬁndings that changes in personality traits may at
least occasionally be in lockstep with changes in the markers of
other major domains of later life are consistent with this possibil-
ity. Findings that early-life measures of personality predict later
health, well-being, and mortality and that not all of these associ-
ations can be accounted for by known and measurable candidate
mediators (Gale, Booth, M~ottus, Kuh, & Deary, 2013; Hamp-
son, Goldberg, Vogt, & Dubanoski, 2006, 2007; Jackson, Con-
nolly, Garrison, Leveille, & Connolly, 2015) are also consistent
with this possibility (although alternative explanations such as
mediation via as yet unknown pathways remain equally possi-
ble). As with cognitive abilities, the feasibility of the hypothesis
that markers of personality differences reﬂect at least partially
overlapping ground with other markers of individual differences
can be tested by using genetic data.
GENERATION SCOTLAND
Using a wide range of relevant examples, we have been building
an argument that at least occasionally and at least some of the
observable associations between markers of psychological dif-
ferences and markers of health and social inequalities may be
difﬁcult to interpret in terms of direct causality among them,
especially given the apparently high phenotypic stability of psy-
chological differences. Inﬂuences may ﬂow in both directions,
but—and this is the possibility we want to emphasize here—
there may be no direct phenotype-to-phenotype causality at all.
That is, a case can be made that the variables that we consider as
indexing different domains of life may sometimes appear corre-
lated simply because of reﬂecting shared etiology. One way to
test this possibility is to make use of genetic data. A standard
approach to testing and accounting for shared genetic inﬂuences
has been using twin-based designs. Here, we make use of an
alternative approach (GCTA; see Table 2 for details), which is
based on molecular genetic data of unrelated individuals. This
approach requires large samples of people with SNP data avail-
able in addition to the phenotypic markers of interest.
A useful resource for applying this approach is provided by
Generation Scotland (GS). GS is a large, population-based, fam-
ily-structured study from across Scotland. A total of 7,953 pro-
bands (aged between 35 and 65 years) were recruited mostly
through their general medical practitioner (GP) in ﬁve regions of
Scotland (Glasgow, Tayside, Ayrshire, Arran, and North-East
Scotland). The probands’ family members were then invited to
participate in the study. A total of 24,084 individuals were
recruited at the baseline wave of GS, which ran from 2006 to
2011. The age range of the sample was between 18 and 100, and
up to three generations of families were sampled. Over 5,600
families participated in total, with a mean of four members per
family (maximum of 37). Note that for many analyses, such as
those reported in this article, only one member per family is
used because the employed method (i.e., GCTA) assumes unre-
lated individuals. Lifestyle, health, physiological, genetic, and
biomarker data were collected on participants along with data
linkage to routine medical health records. Add-on studies to the
initial wave will provide longitudinal clinical and biomarker
data on population subsets with a particular focus on depression,
cognitive ability, and mental health. Full details of the cohort
have been given by Smith and colleagues (2013) and can be
accessed at http://www.generationscotland.org.
Evidence for Shared Genetic Effects:
Cognitive Abilities
Existing GS analyses have investigated the phenotypic and
genetic associations between cognitive ability and various
markers of social or health inequalities, such as education,
neighborhood deprivations (SIMD, a marker of socioeconomic
status), and height. All four of these are complex traits with addi-
tive genetic effects that could be detected using the univariate
GCTA method (see Table 2 for a deﬁnition of additive genetic
effects). The proportion of individual differences in each trait
explained by the additive effects of common genetic variants was
.29 (general cognitive ability; g), .21 (education), .18 (SIMD),
and .58 (height; Marioni, Batty, et al., 2014; Marioni, Davies,
et al., 2014). For g, education, and SIMD, family-based
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heritability estimates have also been calculated and found to be
higher (respectively, .54, .41, and .71; Marioni, Davies, et al.,
2014).
The phenotypic correlation between cognitive ability and
education was .39, whereas for cognitive ability and SIMD it
was .25. This is about what one would expect based on the litera-
ture (Strenze, 2007). What we are more interested in here, of
course, are genetic correlations: the proportions of variance that
variables share due to common genetic causes. Genetic correla-
tions can have any magnitude regardless of the phenotypic cor-
relations, such that even phenotypically unrelated variables may
share genetic inﬂuences or vice versa. To the extent that various
markers of individual difference tap the same underlying var-
iance—the question we are particularly interested in—they are
expected to be genetically correlated.
Interestingly, the genetic correlation between g and education
neared unity (.95, SE5 .13), suggesting that the additive genetic
effects underlying the marker of psychological differences
almost completely overlapped the additive genetic variants
underlying a marker of social inequalities. This is consistent with
ﬁndings based on more traditional behavior genetic approaches
(e.g., Calvin et al., 2012). The genetic correlation between g and
SIMD was notably lower (.26, SE5 .16), suggesting that
although there is additive genetic variance related to where one
lives, this variance is only partially overlapping with that of cog-
nitive abilities. A somewhat smaller phenotypic correlation was
observed between cognitive ability and height (.16), but there
was a signiﬁcant genetic correlation (.28, SE5 .09).
In combination, these ﬁndings highlight some genetic over-
lap of cognitive ability with markers of social inequalities as
well as such a basic anthropometric measure as height. Interest-
ingly, all of these markers of individual differences are com-
monly used as predictors of health outcomes or covariates in
models featuring cognitive ability. Therefore, among other
implications, our results suggest that researchers need to con-
sider the possibility of overﬁtting such models, given the shared
genetic contributions to these characteristics.
Ongoing GS-based analyses are investigating the molecular
genetic overlap between g and body mass index (BMI)—
another common correlate of life-course health outcomes—as
well as the abilities of the polygenic “risk scores” for these traits
to predict across phenotypes. For example, does a polygenic risk
score for BMI predict variance in g? The polygenic risk scores
aggregate small (and mostly statistically nonsigniﬁcant) genetic
effects of up to hundreds of thousands of SNPs in relation to a
phenotype into a single genetic propensity prediction index.
Typically, the genetic effects found for a large number of SNPs
in an independent and sufﬁciently powerful study, regardless of
their statistical signiﬁcance, are used to create such risk scores
(see Table 2 for additional details). For example, Luciano and
colleagues (2014) aimed to see whether there was genetic over-
lap in cognitive ability and diabetes. For this, the authors used
the effect sizes of hundreds of thousands of SNPs in relation to
type 2 diabetes found in a large meta-analysis (Morris et al.,
2012), created diabetes risk scores for a combined sample of
about 3,000 Britons, and then used these risk scores to predict
their cognitive abilities. The results of this study showed little
genetic overlap. However, when a similar risk score technique
was used to investigate the shared genetic basis of schizophrenia
and cognitive ability (g), signiﬁcant overlap was observed
(McIntosh et al., 2013). Also, polygenic risk for autism spec-
trum disorders has been found to correlate with different
markers of cognitive abilities (Clarke et al., in press). GS offers
a rich resource for such hypotheses to be tested.
As GS includes family structures, its data have also been used
in more traditional behavior genetic analyses to disentangle the
associations between markers of psychological differences and
markers of social and health inequalities. For example, Luciano
and colleagues (2010) showed substantial genetic overlap in cog-
nitive ability and a range of cardiovascular disease risk factors.
Evidence for Shared Genetic Effects: Other
Markers of Psychological Differences
While twin studies have presented thousands of heritability esti-
mates for personality traits and amounted to a conclusion that
about 50% variance in almost whichever of them reﬂects genetic
variance (Bleidorn, Kandler, & Caspi, 2014), GCTA-based esti-
mates have only recently started to emerge and have been more
modest in size (e.g., Verweij et al., 2012; Vinkhuyzen et al.,
2012). With its large sample size, GS is a useful data set for car-
rying out such analyses, although participants’ personality self-
ratings have currently been obtained using only the Neuroticism
and Extraversion scales (each operationalized using 12 items) of
the brief version of Eysenck’s Personality Questionnaire
(Eysenck, Eysenck, & Barrett, 1985). These data are summar-
ized in Figure 2. At this moment, therefore, the spectrum of per-
sonality traits is covered to a limited extent in GS, although
there will be efforts to broaden the spectrum. Here, we report
novel, previously unpublished analyses pertaining to Neuroti-
cism and Extraversion in GS: their GCTA-based heritability
estimates as well as phenotypic and genotypic correlations with
education, cognitive abilities, and social class.
Univariate GCTA estimates (Yang et al., 2011) for Neuroti-
cism and Extraversion scales were calculated in the same unre-
lated sample of individuals as used for previously described GS
analyses. The personality scale scores were far from being nor-
mally distributed (Figure 2) and were therefore normalized by
using an averaged angular transformation (Vinkhuyzen et al.,
2012). Linear regression was used to control for age, sex, and
population stratiﬁcation (the ﬁrst six multidimensional scaling
components). Residuals from these models were obtained and
transformed using a rank-based inverse normal transformation
prior to the GCTA analyses. The GCTA estimates for Neuroti-
cism and Extraversion were .16 (SE5 .06, N5 6,349) and .11
(SE5 .05, N5 6,344), which represent small but signiﬁcant
proportions of variance. These estimates are slightly higher than
most of the few previously published estimates (Verweij et al.,
2012; Vinkhuyzen et al., 2012), but still smaller than twin-based
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estimates. This is an important ﬁnding, possibly suggesting that
a substantial proportion of genetic variance in personality traits
is nonadditive.
Prior to assessing whether the personality measures have
shared genetic contributions with g, education, or SIMD, we ﬁrst
investigated their phenotypic correlations (see Table 4). The cor-
relations were all very small, with the exception of those of Neu-
roticism with g and SIMD (–.08 and –.13, respectively). We
therefore took these variables forward to the bivariate GCTA
analysis (Lee, Yang, Goddard, Visscher, & Wray, 2012). SIMD
and g were treated in a similar manner to Neuroticism: Linear
regression was used to obtain age-, sex-, and stratiﬁcation-
adjusted residuals, which were transformed using a rank-based
inverse normal transformation. Bivariate GCTA was then used
to obtain their genetic correlations with Neuroticism.
We observed a large, negative genetic correlation of –.69
(SE5 .20) between Neuroticism and g, which implies that 69%
of the genes associated with better cognitive function are also
associated with a lower Neuroticism score. This ﬁnding is espe-
cially interesting given that a much more modest phenotypic
correlation is typically observed between them (Ackerman &
Heggestad, 1997). The genetic correlation between Neuroticism
and SIMDwas –.09 (SE5 .25), indicating no signiﬁcant genetic
overlap between the genetic inﬂuences on these markers.
In sum, we hope to have shown that molecular genetic data
and modern quantitative genetic techniques can be used to esti-
mate the genetic contribution to the variances and covariances
of the markers of psychological differences and social and
health inequalities. For example, such ﬁndings may point to
situations where observed associations between markers that
ostensibly index different domains of variability may in fact
tap into at least partially overlapping domains (e.g., cognitive
abilities and education or height). With respect to markers of
psychological differences, these data and techniques may cur-
rently work better for cognitive abilities, as they yield higher
GCTA-based heritability estimates and thereby contain more
of the kind of signal that the approach can pick up. GCTA esti-
mates additive genetic variance and covariance, and there
seems to be less of that for personality traits. However, we still
observed a large genetic correlation between Neuroticism and
general cognitive ability.
A LURKING POSSIBILITYOF
CONSTRUCT (OR MEASUREMENT)
OVERLAP
When we ﬁnd that some markers of genetic variability are related
to phenotypes of interest, we want to make sure that the markers
are reasonably independent in terms of not being in linkage dise-
quilibriumwith each other (see Table 2 for additional details). This
is because nonrandom co-segregation of alleles could result in
false signals in genetic studies. Similarly, when linking markers of
phenotype to one another or to markers of genetic variability, we
are well advised to consider the possibility of phenotypic construct
Figure 2 Distribution of Extraversion and Neuroticism scale scores in Generation Scotland.
Table 4 Phenotypic Correlations Between Generation Scotland
Variables
g Education SIMD
Neuroticism 20.08 20.04 20.13
Extraversion 20.03 20.05 20.03
Note. g5 general cognitive ability; SIMD5 Scottish Index of Multiple Deprivation.
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overlap—or at least overlap in how the underlying constructs are
measured. Markers of both psychological differences and social
and health inequalities reﬂect samples of behaviors, skills, knowl-
edge, or (nonrandom) life circumstances, and it is possible that the
samples that we regard as reﬂecting distinct domains may well be
at least partially overlapping.
For example, considering Neuroticism and mental well-
being markers of ontologically distinct domains of individual
differences and explaining one broad characteristic (well-
being) with another (Neuroticism) seems a possible example
of such construct overlap. In addition to this, associations
between these constructs may be confounded by direct
measurement overlap, whereby items to measure one charac-
teristic may be very similar to the items used to measure the
other (Gale et al., 2013). It is then no surprise that the con-
structs also appear genetically overlapping (Weiss, Bates, &
Luciano, 2008). Likewise, relating self-rated aspects of qual-
ity of life, such as satisfaction with one’s physical environment
or social relations, to objectively measured physical and social
environment quality may entail the risk of explaining something
by itself (M~ottus, Gale, Starr, & Deary, 2012). In a similar vein,
when we ﬁnd that a personality trait that is assessed, among other
items, with questions referring to overeating predicts bodyweight,
this may refer to something trivial (Vainik, M~ottus, Allik, Esko,
& Realo, in press).
Another example of such construct/measurement overlap
pertains to cognitive abilities and health literacy, a well-
established marker and predictor of health inequalities that is
closely tied to other markers of social inequalities (Rudd, 2010).
Apparently, the concept of health literacy, or at least its most
popular operationalizations, are only negligibly different from
other markers of cognitive abilities that have been well estab-
lished and researched for well over a century (Murray, Johnson,
Wolf, & Deary, 2011; Wolf et al., 2012). Furthermore, the appa-
rent links between health literacy and various markers of health
seem to be almost fully explainable by the links between other
cognitive abilities and health (M~ottus et al., 2014). Identifying
such cases of construct/measurement overlap is not only impor-
tant for our understanding of how psychological differences are
linked to markers of social and health inequalities but also has
practical implications. For example, interventions targeted at
improving or dealing with the consequences of low health liter-
acy can be informed by decades of research on other cognitive
abilities.
There exist ways of mitigating measurement overlap, at least
to some extent. In personality trait research, for example, self-
ratings could be supplemented with ratings of knowledgeable
informants (Kandler, Riemann, Spinath, & Angleitner, 2010;
M~ottus, Allik, & Pullmann, 2007) or behavioral measurements
(Furr, 2009), or directly overlapping items can be omitted from
the analyses (Gale et al., 2013). In cognitive ability research, the
inﬂuence of measurement overlap may also be reduced by
employing behavioral tasks such as reaction or inspection time
measurements (e.g., Ritchie et al., 2013) or tasks speciﬁc to the
construct at hand (Wolf et al., 2012).
CONCLUSIONS
Associations among the markers of psychological differences
and social and health inequalities are pervasive, albeit often mod-
est in size, and likely to interact with genetic variation. The life-
course-spanning research described in this article makes the case
for being open to very different causal interpretations of the asso-
ciations. In principle, any of these variables may serve as both
predictor and outcome. And what also seems plausible in many
cases is that the variables that we believe to index different
domains of individual differences tap something at least partially
overlapping, potentially causing spurious associations. Cognitive
abilities and educational attainment constitute a good example:
Whatever are the underlying processes that individual differences
in them refer to, these processes seem to reﬂect a largely overlap-
ping genetic basis. But the overlap does not necessarily have to
be genetic, as occasionally our constructs of interest, or at least
their measurement, may overlap phenotypically. The previously
published ﬁndings reviewed here as well as the new analyses pre-
sented for the ﬁrst time demonstrate how molecular genetic data
coupled with modern quantitative genetic techniques can help to
understand the network of factors surrounding psychological dif-
ferences and social and health inequalities.
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and 76.2 (SD5 0.68).
2. The subtests used were Block Design, Matrix Reasoning, Symbol
Search, Digit Symbol-Coding, Digit Span (backward), and Letter-
Number Sequencing.
Potentially Overlapping Markers 11
References
Ackerman, P. L., & Heggestad, E. D. (1997). Intelligence, personal-
ity, and interests: Evidence for overlapping traits. Psychological
Bulletin, 121, 219–245.
Bak, T. H., Nissan, J. J., Allerhand, M. M., & Deary, I. J. (2014).
Does bilingualism inﬂuence cognitive aging? Annals of Neurol-
ogy, 75, 959–963.
Banks, G. C., Batchelor, J. H., & McDaniel, M. A. (2010). Smarter
people are (a bit) more symmetrical: A meta-analysis of the rela-
tionship between intelligence and ﬂuctuating asymmetry. Intelli-
gence, 38, 393–401.
Bazana, P. G., & Stelmack, R. M. (2004). Stability of personality
across the life span: A meta-analysis. In R. M. Stelmack (Ed.),
On the psychobiology of personality: Essays in honor of Marvin
Zuckerman (pp. 113–144). New York: Elsevier Science.
Bleidorn, W., Kandler, C., & Caspi, A. (2014). The behavioural
genetics of personality development in adulthood—Classic, con-
temporary, and future trends. European Journal of Personality,
28, 244–255.
Briley, D. A., & Tucker-Drob, E. M. (2014). Genetic and environ-
mental continuity in personality development: A meta-analysis.
Psychological Bulletin, 140, 1303–1331.
Bulik-Sullivan, B., Finucane, H. K., Anttila, V., Gusev, A., Day,
F. R., Consortium, R., et al. (2015). An atlas of genetic correla-
tions across human diseases and traits. bioRxiv, 014498.
Calvin, C. M., Deary, I. J., Fenton, C., Roberts, B. A., Der, G.,
Leckenby, N., et al. (2011). Intelligence in youth and all-cause-
mortality: Systematic review with meta-analysis. International
Journal of Epidemiology, 40, 626–644.
Calvin, C. M., Deary, I. J., Webbink, D., Smith, P., Fernandes, C.,
Lee, S. H., et al. (2012). Multivariate genetic analyses of cogni-
tion and academic achievement from two population samples of
174,000 and 166,000 school children. Behavior Genetics, 42,
699–710.
Caspi, A., Roberts, B. W., & Shiner, R. L. (2005). Personality devel-
opment: Stability and change. Annual Review of Psychology, 56,
453–484.
Clarke, T.-K., Lupton, M. K., Fernandez-Pujals, A. M., Starr, J.,
Davies, G., Cox, S., et al. (in press). Common polygenic risk for
autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is associated with cognitive abil-
ity in the general population.Molecular Psychiatry.
Corley, J., Gow, A. J., Starr, J. M., & Deary, I. J. (2012). Smoking,
childhood IQ, and cognitive function in old age. Journal of Psy-
chosomatic Research, 73, 132–138.
Deary, I. J. (2012). Looking for “system integrity” in cognitive epi-
demiology. Gerontology, 58, 545–553.
Deary, I. J. (2014). The stability of intelligence from childhood to
old age. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 23, 239–
245.
Deary, I. J., & Der, G. (2005). Reaction time explains IQ’s associa-
tion with death. Psychological Science, 16, 64–69.
Deary, I. J., & Johnson, W. (2010). Intelligence and education:
Causal perceptions drive analytic processes and therefore conclu-
sions. International Journal of Epidemiology, 39, 1362–1369.
Deary, I. J., Pattie, A., & Starr, J. M. (2013). The stability of intelli-
gence from age 11 to age 90 years: The Lothian Birth Cohort of
1921. Psychological Science, 24, 2361–2368.
Deary, I. J., Whalley, L. J., Lemmon, H., Crawford, J. R., & Starr,
J. M. (2000). The stability of individual differences in mental
ability from childhood to old age: Follow-up of the 1932 Scottish
Mental Survey. Intelligence, 28, 49–55.
Deary, I. J., Whalley, L. J., & Starr, J. M. (2009). A lifetime of intelli-
gence: Follow-up studies of the Scottish Mental Surveys of 1932
and 1947. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Deary, I. J., Whiteman, M. C., Starr, J. M., Whalley, L. J., & Fox,
H. C. (2004). The impact of childhood intelligence on later life:
Following up the Scottish Mental Surveys of 1932 and 1947.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 86, 130–147.
Deary, I. J., Yang, J., Davies, G., Harris, S. E., Tenesa, A., Liewald,
D., et al. (2012). Genetic contributions to stability and
change in intelligence from childhood to old age. Nature, 482,
212–215.
Edmonds, G. W., Goldberg, L. R., Hampson, S. E., & Barckley, M.
(2013). Personality stability from childhood to midlife: Relating
teachers’ assessments in elementary school to observer- and self-
ratings 40 years later. Journal of Research in Personality, 47,
505–513.
Eysenck, S. B. G., Eysenck, H. J., & Barrett, P. (1985). A revised
version of the Psychoticism Scale. Personality and Individual
Differences, 6, 21–29.
Falch, T., & Sandgren Massih, S. (2011). The effect of education on
cognitive ability. Economic Inquiry, 49, 838–856.
Furr, R. M. (2009). Personality psychology as a truly behavioural sci-
ence. European Journal of Personality, 23, 369–401.
Gale, C. R., Batty, G. D., Cooper, C., & Deary, I. J. (2009). Psycho-
motor coordination and intelligence in childhood and health in
adulthood—Testing the system integrity hypothesis. Psychoso-
matic Medicine, 71, 675–681.
Gale, C. R., Booth, T., M~ottus, R., Kuh, D., & Deary, I. J. (2013).
Neuroticism and extraversion in youth predict mental wellbeing
and life satisfaction 40 years later. Journal of Research in Per-
sonality, 47, 687–697.
Gow, A. J., Corley, J., Starr, J. M., & Deary, I. J. (2012). Reverse
causation in activity-cognitive ability associations: The Lothian
Birth Cohort 1936. Psychology and Aging, 27, 250–255.
Gow, A. J., Corley, J., Starr, J. M., & Deary, I. J. (2013). Which
social network or support factors are associated with cognitive
abilities in old age? Gerontology, 59, 454–463. doi:10.1159/
000351265
Gow, A. J., Johnson, W., Pattie, A., Brett, C. E., Roberts, B., Starr,
J. M., et al. (2011). Stability and change in intelligence from age
11 to ages 70, 79, and 87: The Lothian Birth Cohorts of 1921 and
1936. Psychology and Aging, 26, 232–240.
Hagger-Johnson, G., M~ottus, R., Craig, L. C. A., Starr, J. M., &
Deary, I. J. (2012). Pathways from childhood intelligence and
socio-economic status to late-life cardiovascular disease risk.
Health Psychology, 31, 403–412.
Hampson, S. E., Goldberg, L. R., Vogt, T. M., & Dubanoski, J. P.
(2006). Forty years on: Teachers’ assessments of children’s
12 M~ottus, Marioni, & Deary
personality traits predict self-reported health behaviors and out-
comes at midlife. Health Psychology, 25, 57–64.
Hampson, S. E., Goldberg, L. R., Vogt, T. M., & Dubanoski, J. P.
(2007). Mechanisms by which childhood personality traits inﬂu-
ence adult health status. Health Psychology, 26, 121–125.
Haring, B., Leng, X., Robinson, J., Johnson, K. C., Jackson, R. D.,
Beyth, R., et al. (2013). Cardiovascular disease and cognitive
decline in postmenopausal women: Results from the Women’s
Health Initiative Memory Study. Journal of the American Heart
Association, 2, e000369.
Hope, D., Bates, T. C., Dykiert, D., Der, G., & Deary, I. J. (2013).
Bodily symmetry increases across human childhood. Early
Human Development, 89, 531–535.
Hope, D., Bates, T. C., Dykiert, D., Der, G., & Deary, I. J. (2015).
More symmetrical children have faster and more consistent
choice reaction times. Developmental Psychology, 51, 524–
532.
Hope, D., Bates, T., Penke, L., Gow, A. J., Starr, J. M., & Deary, I. J.
(2013). Symmetry of the face in old age reﬂects childhood social
status. Economics and Human Biology, 11, 236–244.
Jackson, J. J., Connolly, J. J., Garrison, S. M., Leveille, M. M., &
Connolly, S. L. (2015). Your friends know how long you will
live: A 75-year study of peer-rated personality traits. Psychologi-
cal Science, 26, 335–340.
Kandler, C., Riemann, R., Spinath, F. M., & Angleitner, A. (2010).
Sources of variance in personality facets: A multiple-rater twin
study of self-peer, peer-peer, and self-self (dis)agreement. Jour-
nal of Personality, 78, 1565–1594.
Kave, G., Eyal, N., Shorek, A., & Cohen-Mansﬁeld, J. (2008). Multi-
lingualism and cognitive state in the oldest old. Psychology and
Aging, 23, 70–78.
Lee, S. H., Yang, J., Goddard, M. E., Visscher, P. M., & Wray, N. R.
(2012). Estimation of pleiotropy between complex diseases using
single-nucleotide polymorphism-derived genomic relationships
and restricted maximum likelihood. Bioinformatics, 28, 2540–
2542.
Luciano, M., Batty, G. D., McGilchrist, M., Linksted, P., Fitzpatrick,
B., Jackson, C., et al. (2010). Shared genetic aetiology between
cognitive ability and cardiovascular disease risk factors: Genera-
tion Scotland’s Scottish Family Health Study. Intelligence, 38,
304–313.
Luciano, M., M~ottus, R., Harris, S. E., Davies, G., Payton, A.,
Ollier, W. E. R., ET AL. (2014). Predicting cognitive ability
in ageing cohorts using type 2 diabetes genetic risk. Diabetic
Medicine: A Journal of the British Diabetic Association, 31,
714–720.
Mackenbach, J. P., Stirbu, I., Roskam, A.-J. R., Schaap, M. M.,
Menvielle, G., Leinsalu, M., et al. (2008). Socioeconomic
inequalities in health in 22 European countries. New England
Journal of Medicine, 358, 2468–2481.
Marioni, R. E., Batty, G. D., Hayward, C., Kerr, S. M., Campbell,
A., Hocking, L. J., et al. (2014). Common genetic variants
explain the majority of the correlation between height and intelli-
gence: The Generation Scotland study. Behavior Genetics, 44,
91–96.
Marioni, R. E., Davies, G., Hayward, C., Liewald, D., Kerr, S. M.,
Campbell, A., et al. (2014). Molecular genetic contributions to
socioeconomic status and intelligence. Intelligence, 44, 26–32.
McIntosh, A. M., Gow, A., Luciano, M., Davies, G., Liewald, D. C.,
Harris, S. E., et al. (2013). Polygenic risk for schizophrenia is
associated with cognitive change between childhood and old age.
Biological Psychiatry, 73, 938–943.
Morris, A. P., Voight, B. F., Teslovich, T. M., Ferreira, T., Segre`,
A. V., Steinthorsdottir, V., et al. (2012). Large-scale association
analysis provides insights into the genetic architecture and patho-
physiology of type 2 diabetes. Nature Genetics, 44, 981–990.
M~ottus, R., Allik, J., & Pullmann, H. (2007). Does personality vary
across ability levels? A study using self and other ratings. Journal
of Research in Personality, 41, 155–170.
M~ottus, R., Gale, C. R., Starr, J. M., & Deary, I. J. (2012). “On the
street where you live”: Neighbourhood deprivation and quality of
life among community-dwelling older people in Edinburgh, Scot-
land. Social Science & Medicine, 74, 1368–1374.
M~ottus, R., Johnson, W., & Deary, I. J. (2012). Personality traits in
old age: Substantial structural and rank-order stability, and some
mean-level change. Psychology and Aging, 27, 243–249.
M~ottus, R., Johnson, W., Murray, C., Wolf, M. S., Starr, J. M., &
Deary, I. J. (2014). Towards understanding the links between health
literacy and physical health. Health Psychology, 33, 164–173.
M~ottus, R., Johnson, W., Starr, J. M., & Deary, I. J. (2012). Correlates
of personality trait levels and their changes in very old age: The
Lothian Birth Cohort 1921. Journal of Research in Personality,
46, 271–278.
M~ottus, R., Luciano, M., Starr, J. M., & Deary, I. J. (2013). Diabetes
and life-long cognitive ability. Journal of Psychosomatic
Research, 75, 275–278.
Murray, C., Johnson, W., Wolf, M. S., & Deary, I. J. (2011). The
association between cognitive ability across the lifespan and
health literacy in old age: The Lothian Birth Cohort 1936. Intelli-
gence, 39, 178–187.
Nash, D. T., & Fillit, H. (2006). Cardiovascular disease risk factors
and cognitive impairment. American Journal of Cardiology, 97,
1262–1265.
Pluess, M., & Bartley, M. (2015). Childhood conscientiousness pre-
dicts the social gradient of smoking in adulthood: A life course
analysis. Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health, 69,
330–338.
Ritchie, S. J., Bates, T. C., & Deary, I. J. (2015). Is education associ-
ated with improvements in general cognitive ability, or in speciﬁc
skills? Developmental Psychology, 51, 573–582.
Ritchie, S. J., Bates, T. C., Der, G., Starr, J. M., & Deary, I. J.
(2013). Education is associated with higher later life IQ scores,
but not with faster cognitive processing speed. Psychology and
Aging, 28, 515–521.
Roberts, B. W., & DelVecchio, W. F. (2000). The rank-order consis-
tency of personality traits from childhood to old age: A quantita-
tive review of longitudinal studies. Psychological Bulletin, 126,
3–25.
Rudd, R. E. (2010). Improving Americans’ health Literacy. New
England Journal of Medicine, 363, 2283–2285.
Potentially Overlapping Markers 13
Santarnecchi, E., Rossi, S., & Rossi, A. (2015). The smarter, the stron-
ger: Intelligence level correlates with brain resilience to systematic
insults. Cortex, 64, 293–309. doi:10.1016/j.cortex.2014.11.005
Scottish Executive. (2006). Scottish Index of Multiple Deprivation
2006. Edinburgh: Author.
Smart, E. L., Gow, A. J., & Deary, I. J. (2014). Occupational com-
plexity and lifetime cognitive abilities. Neurology, 83, 2285–
2291. doi:10.1212/WNL.0000000000001075
Smith, B. H., Campbell, A., Linksted, P., Fitzpatrick, B., Jackson,
C., Kerr, S. M., et al. (2013). Cohort proﬁle: Generation Scotland:
Scottish Family Health Study (GS:SFHS). The study, its partici-
pants and their potential for genetic research on health and illness.
International Journal of Epidemiology, 42, 689–700.
Specht, J., Bleidorn, W., Denissen, J. J. A., Hennecke, M.,
Hutteman, R., Kandler, C., et al. (2014). What drives adult per-
sonality development? A comparison of theoretical perspectives
and empirical evidence. European Journal of Personality, 28,
216–230.
Specht, J., Egloff, B., & Schmukle, S. C. (2011). Stability and
change of personality across the life course: The impact of age
and major life events on mean-level and rank-order stability of
the Big Five. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 101,
862–882.
Strachan, M. W. J., Deary, I. J., Ewing, F. M. E., & Frier, B. M.
(1997). Is type II diabetes associated with an increased risk of
cognitive dysfunction? A critical review of published studies.
Diabetes Care, 20, 438–445.
Strachan, M. W. J., Reynolds, R. M., Marioni, R. E., & Price, J. F.
(2011). Cognitive function, dementia and type 2 diabetes mellitus
in the elderly. Nature Reviews Endocrinology, 7, 108–114.
Strenze, T. (2007). Intelligence and socioeconomic success: A meta-
analytic review of longitudinal research. Intelligence, 35, 401–426.
Townsend, P. (1962). The last refuge: A survey of residential institu-
tions and homes for the aged in England and Wales. London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Turkheimer, E., Pettersson, E., & Horn, E. E. (2014). A phenotypic
null hypothesis for the genetics of personality. Annual Review of
Psychology, 65, 515–540.
Turkheimer, E., & Waldron, M. (2000). Nonshared environment: A
theoretical, methodological, and quantitative review. Psychologi-
cal Bulletin, 126, 78–108.
Vainik, U., M~ottus, R., Allik, J., Esko, T., & Realo, A. (in press).
Are trait-outcome associations caused by scales or particular
items? Example analysis of personality facets and BMI. Euro-
pean Journal of Personality.
Van der Linden, D., te Nijenhuis, J., & Bakker, A. B. (2010). The
general factor of personality: A meta-analysis of Big Five inter-
correlations and a criterion-related validity study. Journal of
Research in Personality, 44, 315–327.
Verweij, K. J. H., Yang, J., Lahti, J., Veijola, J., Hintsanen, M.,
Pulkki-Råback, L., et al. (2012). Maintenance of genetic variation
in human personality: Testing evolutionary models by estimating
heritability due to common causal variants and investigating the
effect of distant inbreeding. Evolution, 66, 3238–3251.
Vinkhuyzen, A. A. E., Pedersen, N. L., Yang, J., Lee, S. H.,
Magnusson, P. K. E., Iacono, W. G., et al. (2012). Common SNPs
explain some of the variation in the personality dimensions of neu-
roticism and extraversion. Translational Psychiatry, 2, e102.
Wechsler, D. (1997). Wechsler adult intelligence scale (3rd ed). San
Antonio, TX: The Psychological Corporation.
Weiss, A., Bates, T. C., & Luciano, M. (2008). Happiness is a per-
sonal(ity) thing: The genetics of personality and well-being in a
representative sample. Psychological Science, 19, 205–210.
Wolf, M. S., Curtis, L. M., Wilson, E. A. H., Revelle, W., Waite,
K. R., Smith, S. G., et al. (2012). Literacy, cognitive function,
and health: Results of the LitCog Study. Journal of General
Internal Medicine, 27, 1300–1307.
Yang, J., Lee, S. H., Goddard, M. E., & Visscher, P. M. (2011).
GCTA: A tool for genome-wide complex trait analysis. American
Journal of Human Genetics, 88, 76–82.
14 M~ottus, Marioni, & Deary
